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Résumé : Pour la plupart des systèmes de représentation de la connaissance
orientés concept, l'un des problèmes principaux relève de la commodité tech-
nique. A savoir, la représentation de connaissance en termes prototypiques,
tout comme la possibilité d'exploiter des formes de raisonnement conceptuel
basées sur la typicalité, ne sont pas autorisées. Au contraire, dans les sciences
cognitives, il existe des données en faveur de concepts prototypiques, et des
formes non-monotoniques de raisonnement conceptuel ont été largement étu-
diées. Ce fossé cognitif concernant la représentation et le raisonnement consti-
tue un problème pour les systèmes computationnels, puisque l'information pro-
totypique joue un rôle crucial dans plusieurs tâches importantes. Dans la lignée
des théories du raisonnement et de la rationalité dites du double processus,
nous soutenons que la représentation conceptuelle dans les systèmes compu-
tationnels devrait dépendre de (au moins) deux composantes représentation-
nelles, chacune spécialisée dans le traitement de diérents genres de processus
de raisonnement. Dans cet article, nous présentons les avantages computa-
tionnels de cette approche en termes de double processus, et les comparons
brièvement avec d'autres solutions d'orientation logique, adoptées pour traiter
du même problème.
Abstract: One of the main problems of most contemporary concept-oriented
knowledge representation systems is one of technical convenience. Namely the
representation of knowledge in prototypical terms and the possibility of ex-
ploiting forms of typicality-based conceptual reasoning, are not permitted. In
contrast, in the cognitive sciences, evidence exists in favour of prototypical
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concepts, and non-monotonic forms of conceptual reasoning have been exten-
sively studied. This cognitive representational and reasoning gap constitutes
a problem for computational systems, since prototypical information plays a
crucial role in many relevant tasks. Inspired by the so-called dual process
theories of reasoning and rationality, we propose that conceptual representa-
tion in computational systems should rely on (at least) two representational
components, that are specialized in dealing with dierent kinds of reasoning
processes. In this article, the theoretical and computational advantages of
such dual process proposals are presented and briey compared to other
logic-oriented solutions adopted to confront the same problem.
1 Introduction
In this article we concentrate on the problem of representing concepts in the
context of articial intelligence (AI) and of computational modelling of cog-
nition. These are highly relevant problems, for example in the eld of the
development of computational ontologies.
One of the main problems of most contemporary concept oriented knowl-
edge representation systems (KRs, including formal ontologies), is that, for
technical convenience, they do not admit the representation of concepts in
prototypical terms. In this way, the possibility of exploiting forms of typicality-
based conceptual reasoning is excluded. In contrast, in the cognitive sciences
evidence exists in favour of prototypical concepts, and non-monotonic forms
of approximate conceptual reasoning have been extensively studied (see sec-
tion 2, below). This cognitive representational and reasoning gap constitutes
a problem for computational systems, since prototypical information plays a
crucial role in many relevant tasks. The historical reasons concerning the mo-
tivations of the abandon, in AI, of the typicality-based systems in favour of
more rigorous formal approaches is outlined in section 3.
Given this state of aairs, we propose that some suggestions to face this
problem should come from the psychology of reasoning. Indeed, in our view, a
mature methodology to approach knowledge representation (KR) should also
take advantage of the empirical results of cognitive research. In this paper, we
put forward an approach towards conceptual representation inspired by the
so-called dual process theories of reasoning and rationality [Stanovich & West
2000], [Evans & Frankish 2008] (section 4). According to such theories, the
existence of two dierent types of cognitive systems is assumed. The systems
of the rst type (type 1) are phylogenetically older than those of the second
type, unconscious, automatic, associative, parallel and fast. The systems of
the second type (type 2) are more recent, conscious, sequential and slow, and
are based on explicit rule following. In our opinion, there are good prima facie
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reasons to believe that in human subjects, tasks usually accounted for by KRs
are type 2 tasks (they are dicult, slow, sequential tasks). However, excep-
tions and prototypical knowledge could play an important role in processes
such as categorisation, which is more likely to be a type 1 task: it is fast,
automatic, and so on. Therefore, we advance the hypothesis that conceptual
representation in computational systems should be equipped by (at least) two
dierent kinds of component1 each responsible for dierent processes: type 2
processes, involved in complex inference tasks and that do not take into ac-
count the representation of prototypical knowledge, and fast automatic type 1
processes, which perform categorisation taking advantage of prototypical in-
formation associated with concepts (section 5).
2 Prototypical eects vs. compositionality
in concept representation
In the eld of cognitive psychology, most research on concepts moves from
critiques to the so-called classical theory of concepts, i.e., the traditional point
of view according to which concepts can be dened in terms of necessary and
sucient conditions. The central claim of the classical theory of concepts is
that every concept c can be dened in terms of a set of features (or condi-
tions) f1, . . . , fn that are individually necessary and jointly sucient for the
application of c. In other words, everything that satises features f1, . . . , fn
is a c, and if anything is a c, then it must satisfy f1, . . . , fn. For example,
the features that dene the concept bachelor could be human, male, adult
and unmarried ; the conditions dening square could be regular polygon and
quadrilateral. This point of view was unanimously and tacitly accepted by
psychologists, philosophers and linguists until the middle of the 20th century.
Chronologically, the rst critique of classical theory was by a philoso-
pher: in a well-known section from the Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig
Wittgenstein observes that it is impossible to identify a set of necessary and
sucient conditions to dene a concept such as GAME [Wittgenstein 1953,
 66]. Therefore, concepts exist which cannot be dened according to classical
theory, i.e., in terms of necessary and sucient conditions. Concepts such
as GAME rest on a complex network of family resemblances. Wittgenstein
introduces this notion in another passage in the Investigations:
I can think of no better expression to characterise these simi-
larities than family resemblances; for the various resemblances
between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait,
temperament, etc. [Wittgenstein 1953,  67]
1. For a similar approach, see [Piccinini 2011]. A way to split the traditional
notion of concept along dierent lines has been proposed by [Machery 2005].
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Wittgenstein's considerations were corroborated by empirical psychological
research. Starting from the seminal work by Eleanor Rosch [Rosch 1975],
psychological experiments showed how common-sense concepts do not obey the
requirement of the classical theory.2 Common-sense concepts cannot usually
be dened in terms of necessary and sucient conditions (and even if for some
concepts such a denition is available, subjects do not use it in many cognitive
tasks). Concepts exhibit prototypical eects: some members of a category are
considered better instances than others. For example, a robin is considered
a better example of the category of birds than, say, a penguin or an ostrich.
More central instances share certain typical features (e.g., the ability to y
for birds, to have fur for mammals) that, in general, are neither necessary nor
sucient conditions for the concept.
Prototypical eects are a well-established empirical phenomenon. How-
ever, the characterisation of concepts in prototypical terms is dicult to rec-
oncile with the compositionality requirement. In a compositional system of rep-
resentations, we can distinguish between a set of primitive, or atomic, symbols
and a set of complex symbols. Complex symbols are generated from primitive
symbols through the application of a set of suitable recursive syntactic rules
(generally, a potentially innite set of complex symbols can be generated from
a nite set of primitive symbols). Natural languages is the paradigmatic ex-
ample of compositional systems: primitive symbols correspond to the elements
of the lexicon, and complex symbols include the (potentially innite) set of
all sentences.
In compositional systems, the meaning of a complex symbol s functionally
depends on the syntactic structure of s, as well as on the meaning of primitive
symbols within s. In other words, the meaning of complex symbols can be
determined by means of recursive semantic rules that work in parallel with
syntactic composition rules. This is the so-called principle of compositionality
of meaning, which Gottlob Frege identied as one of the main features of
human natural languages.
Within cognitive science, it is often assumed that concepts are the compo-
nents of thought, and that mental representations are compositional structures
recursively built up starting from (atomic) concepts. However, according to a
well-known argument by [Fodor 1981], prototypical eects cannot be accom-
modated with compositionality. In brief, Fodor's argument runs as follows:
consider a concept like PET FISH. It results from the composition of the con-
cept PET and the concept FISH. However, the prototype of PET FISH cannot
result from the composition of the prototypes of PET and FISH. Indeed, a typ-
ical PET is furry and warm, a typical FISH is greyish, but a typical PET FISH
is neither furry and warm nor greyish. Therefore, some strain exists between
the requirement of compositionality and the need to characterise concepts in
compositional terms.
2. On the empirical inadequacy of the classical theory and the psychological the-
ories of concepts see [Murphy 2002].
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3 Representing concepts in computational
systems
The situation outlined in the section above is, to some extent, reected by the
state of the art in AI and, in general, in the eld of computational modelling
of cognition. This research area often seems to oscillate between dierent
(and hardly compatible) points of view [Frixione & Lieto 2011]. In AI, the
representation of concepts lies mainly within the KR eld. Symbolic KRs are
formalisms whose structure is, broadly speaking, language-like. This usually
entails assuming that KRs are compositional.
In their early development (historically corresponding to the late 1960s
and the 1970s), many KRs that are oriented towards conceptual representa-
tions attempted to take into account suggestions from psychological research.
Examples are early semantic networks and frame systems. Frame and seman-
tic networks were originally proposed as alternatives to the use of logic in KR.
The notion of frame was developed by Marvin Minsky [Minsky 1975] as a so-
lution to the problem of representing structured knowledge in AI systems.3
Both frames and most semantic networks allowed the possibility of concept
characterisation in terms of prototypical information.
However, such early KRs were usually characterised in a rather rough and
imprecise way. They lacked a clear formal denition, with the study of their
meta-theoretical properties being almost impossible. When AI practitioners
tried to provide a stronger formal foundation for concept-oriented KRs, it
turned out to be dicult to reconcile compositionality and prototypical rep-
resentations. In consequence, practitioners often chose to sacrice the latter.
In particular, this is the solution adopted in a class of concept-oriented KRs
which were (and still are) widespread within AI, namely the class of formalisms
that stem from the so-called structured inheritance networks and the KL-ONE
system [Brachman & Schmolze 1985]. Such systems were subsequently called
terminological logics, and today are usually known as description logics (DLs)
[Baader, Calvanese et al. 2010]. From a formal point of view, DLs are subsets
of rst order predicate logic that, if compared to full rst order logic, are
computationally more ecient.
In more recent years, representation systems in this tradition (such as the
formal ontologies) have been directly formulated as logical formalisms (the
above-mentioned DLs, [Baader, Calvanese et al. 2010]), in which Tarskian,
compositional semantics is directly associated with the syntax of the language.
This has been achieved at the cost of not allowing exceptions to inheritance
and, in this way, we have forsaken the possibility to represent concepts in
prototypical terms. From this point of view, such formalisms can be seen
3. Many of the original articles describing these early KRs can be found in
[Brachman & Levesque 1985], a collection of classic papers of the eld.
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as a revival of the classical theory of concepts, in spite of its empirical in-
adequacy in dealing with most common-sense concepts. Nowadays, DLs are
widely adopted within many elds of application, in particular within that of
the representation of ontologies. This is a problem for KRs since prototypi-
cal eects in categorisation and, in general, in category representation, are of
the greatest importance in representing concepts in both natural and articial
systems.
Several proposals have been advanced to extend concept-oriented KRs and
DLs in particular, in such a way as to represent non-classical concepts. Various
fuzzy extensions of DLs [Bobillo & Straccia 2009] and ontology-oriented for-
malisms have been proposed to represent vague information in semantic lan-
guages. However, from the standpoint of conceptual knowledge representation,
it is well-known [Osherson & Smith 1981] that approaches to prototypical ef-
fects based on fuzzy logic encounter diculties with compositionality. In short,
Osherson and Smith show that the approaches to prototypical eects based
on fuzzy logic are vulnerable to the problem of compositionality mentioned at
the end of section 2.
A dierent way to face the representation of non-classical concepts in DL
systems exists, namely DL extensions based on some non-monotonic logic. For
example, [Baader & Hollunder 1995] proposed an extension of the ALCF sys-
tem based on Reiter's default logic.4 The same authors, however, point out
both the semantic and computational diculties of this integration and, for
this reason, propose restricted semantics for open default theories, in which
the default rules are only applied to individuals explicitly represented in the
knowledge base. [Bonatti, Lutz et al. 2006] proposed an extension of DLs with
circumscription. One of the reasons for applying circumscription is the possi-
bility to express prototypical properties with exceptions, something which is
done by introducing abnormality predicates whose extension is minimized.
More recently, [Giordano, Gliozzi et al. 2013] proposed an approach to un-
feasible inheritance based on the introduction in the ALC DL of a typicality
operator T, which allows prototypical properties and inheritance with excep-
tions to be reasoned about in part. However, we shall return later (section 5)
to the plausibility of non-monotonic extensions of DL formalisms, as a way to
confront the problem of representing concepts in prototypical terms.
4. The authors pointed out that Reiter's default rule approach seems to t well
into the philosophy of terminological systems because most of them already provide
their users with a form of monotonic rules. These rules can be considered as special
default rules where the justicationswhich make the behaviour of default rules
non-monotonicare absent.
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4 The dual process approach and its
computational developments
In our opinion, a dierent approach to aront the state of aairs described
above should come from the so-called dual process theories. As anticipated in
the introductory section, according to the dual process theories [Stanovich &
West 2000], [Evans & Frankish 2008], two dierent types of cognitive system
exist, which are called respectively system(s) 1 and system(s) 2.
System 1 processes are automatic. They are phylogenetically the older of
the two, and are often shared between humans and other animal species. They
are innate, and control instinctive behaviors; so they do not depend on train-
ing or specic individual abilities and are generally cognitively undemanding.
They are associative, and operate in a parallel and fast way. Moreover, they
are not consciously accessible to the subject.
System 2 processes are phylogenetically more recent than system 1 pro-
cesses, and are specic to the human species. They are conscious and cogni-
tively penetrable (i.e., accessible to consciousness) and are based on explicit
rule following. As a consequence, if compared to system 1, system 2 pro-
cesses are sequential, slower, and cognitively more demanding. Performances
that depend on system 2 processes are usually aected by acquired skills and
dierences in individual capabilities.
The dual process approach was originally proposed to account for system-
atic errors in reasoning tasks: systematic reasoning errors (consider the classi-
cal examples of the selection task or the so-called conjunction fallacy) should be
ascribed to fast, associative and automatic system 1 processes, while system 2
is responsible for the slow and cognitively demanding activity of producing
answers that are correct with respect to the canons of normative rationality.
An example is the well-known Linda problem, in which participants are given
a description of Linda that stresses her independence and liberal views, and
then asked whether it is more likely that she is (a) a bank teller or (b) a bank
teller and active in the feminist movement. Participants tend to choose (b),
since it ts the description of Linda (following the heuristic representative-
ness), even though the co-occurrence of two events cannot be more likely than
one of them alone.
A rst theoretical attempt to apply the dual process theory to the eld
of computational modelling has been developed by Sloman [Sloman 1996],
whose proposal is based on the computational distinction between two types
of reasoning systems. System 1 is associative and is attuned to encoding
and processing statistical regularities and correlations in the environment.
System 2 is rule-based. The representations in this system are symbolic and
unbounded, in that they are based on propositions that can be compositionally
combined. Sloman uses Smolensky's [Smolensky 1988] connectionist frame-
work to describe the computational dierences between system 1 and sys-
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tem 2. Smolensky contrasted two types of inferential mechanisms within a
connectionist framework: an intuitive processor and a conscious rule inter-
preter. Sloman claims that both system 1 (intuitive processor) and system 2
(conscious rule interpreter) are implemented by the same hardware but use
dierent types of knowledge that are represented dierently. The relationship
between the systems is described as interactive. Moreover, he proposes that
the two systems operate in concert and produce dierent outputs that are
both useful but in dierent ways. Therefore, by using the terminology pro-
posed by Evans [Evans 2008], in Sloman the two computational systems are
supposed to be parallel-competitive in nature, dierently from the traditional
default-interventionist approach, that is typical of the dual process proposals
(according to such default-interventionist approach the deliberative system 2
reasoning processes can inhibit the biased responses of the system 1 processes
and replace them with correct outputs based on reective reasoning).
In recent years, the cognitive modelling community placed growing at-
tention on the dual process theories as a framework for modelling cognition
beyond the rational, in the sense of [Kennedy, Ritter et al. 2012]. This deter-
mined two main eects: (i) a strong eort of rethinking some classical cognitive
architecture in terms of the dual process theory; and (ii) the development of
new cognitively inspired articial models embedding some theoretical aspects
of the dual theory. In this section we will review some examples of these two
eects.
As far as point (i) is concerned, there are at least three examples of pre-
existing hybrid cognitive architectures that have been reconsidered in terms
of the dual process hypothesis. Soar has recently included the initial system 1
form of assessment of a situation and used it as the basis for reinforcement
learning [Laird 2008], ACT-R [Anderson, Bothell et al. 2004] now integrates
explicit, declarative (i.e., system 2) representations and implicit procedural
(system 1) cognitive processes.5 Similarly, the CLARION architecture [Hélie &
Sun 2010] adopts a dual representation of knowledge, consisting of a symbolic
component to manage explicit knowledge (system 2) and a low-level compo-
nent to manage tacit knowledge (system 1). More recently, in the eld of AGI
(Articial General Intelligence, see [McCarthy 2007]) a dual process multi-
purpose cognitive architecture has been proposed [Strannegård, von Haugwitz
et al. 2013]. The architecture is based on two memory systems: (i) long-term
memory, which is an autonomous system that develops automatically through
interactions with the environment, and (ii) working memory, which is used to
perform (resource-bounded) computation. Computations are dened as pro-
cesses in which working memory content is transformed according to rules that
are stored in the long-term memory. In such architecture, the long-term mem-
ory is modelled as a transparent neural network that develops autonomously
5. Dierently from CLARION, ACT-R does not use a double level, e.g., symbolic
and sub-symbolic, of representations. Its type 1 processes are based, as the type
2 ones, on the same layer of procedural-based, symbolic, knowledge.
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by interacting with the environment and that is able to activate both system 1
and system 2 processes. The working memory (system 1) is modelled as a
buer containing nodes of the long-term memory.
At the same time as the above-mentioned developments within the eld
of cognitive architectures, some new models were proposed, that are directly
inspired by the dual process approach. A rst example is the mReasoner
model [Khemlani & Johnson-Laird 2013], developed with the aim of provid-
ing a unied computational architecture of reasoning6 based on the mental
model theory proposed by Philip Johnson-Laird. The mReasoner architecture
is based on three components: a system 0, a system 1 and a system 2. The last
two correspond to those hypothesized by the dual process approach. System 0
operates at the level of linguistic pre-processing. It parses the premises of an
argument using natural language processing techniques, and then creates an
initial intensional model of them. System 1 uses this intensional representation
to build an extensional model, and uses heuristics to provide rapid reasoning
conclusions. Finally, system 2 carries out more demanding processes to search
for alternative models if the initial conclusion does not hold or if it is not
satisfactory.
A second model has been proposed by [Larue, Poirier et al. 2012]. The
authors adopted an extended version of the dual process approach based on
the hypothesis that system 2 is subdivided into two further levels, respectively
called algorithmic and reective. The goal of Larue et al. is to build a
multi-agent and multi-level architecture that can represent the emergence of
emotions in a biologically inspired computational environment.
Another model that can be included in this class has been proposed by
[Pilato, Augello et al. 2012]. These authors do not explicitly mention the
dual process approach; however, they built a hybrid system for conversational
agents (chatbots) where the agents' background knowledge is represented using
both a symbolic and a subsymbolic approach. The authors associate dierent
types of representations with dierent types of reasoning. Namely determinis-
tic reasoning is associated with symbolic (system 2) representations, and asso-
ciative reasoning is liked to the subsymbolic (system 1) component. Dierently
from the other models that follow the dual approach, the authors do not make
any claim about the sequence of activation and the conciliation strategy of the
two representational and reasoning processes. However, such a conciliation
strategy plays a crucial role in the eld of the dual-process based computa-
tional systems. Elsewhere [Frixione & Lieto 2012, 2014] we have presented a
novel computational strategy for the integration of the system 1 and system 2
processes in the eld of a dual process account of concepts in semantic tech-
nologies. Such a strategy, dierently from both the default-interventionist
proposal (where system 1 processes are the default ones and are then checked
against the system 2) and from Sloman's proposal of naturally-parallel com-
6. The appeal to the need of unitary computational architectures in Cognitive
Science and AI is not new. See e.g., [Newell 1990].
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putations, is computationally more conservative and safe, since the typical-
ity based reasoning is considered as an extension of the classical one and is
only exploited in the case of unsatisfactory results provided by the classical,
S2, component (that is compositional and that performs only deductive, and
therefore logically correct, inferences).
It is worth noting that other examples of computational models that are
in some sense akin to the dual process proposal can be found even if their pro-
ponents do not explicitly mention this approach. Consider for example many
hybrid, symbolic-connectionist systems, in which the connectionist component
is used to model fast, associative processes, while the symbolic component is
responsible for explicit, declarative computations [Wermter & Sun 2000].
5 Dual processes and concept representation
In our opinion, the distinction between system 1 and system 2 processes could
be plausibly applied to the problem of conceptual representation as it emerged
in the sections above. In particular, categorisation based on prototypical infor-
mation is in most cases a fast and automatic process, which does not require
any explicit eort, and which therefore can presumably be attributed to a
type 1 system. In contrast, the types of inference that are typical of DL sys-
tems (such as classication and consistency checking) are slow, cognitively
demanding processes that are more likely to be attributed to a type 2 system.
Let us consider for example the case of classication. In a DL system,
classifying a concept in taxonomy amounts to individualising its more specic
superconcepts and its more general subconcepts. As an example, let us suppose
that a certain concept C is described as a subconcept of the concept S, and
that each instance of C has at least three llers of the attribute R that are
instances of the concept B. Let us assume also that these traits in conjunction
are sucient to be a C (i.e., everything that is an S with at least three llers
of the attribute R that are Bs is also a C). Let us suppose now that another
concept C′ is described as an S with exactly ve llers of the attribute R that
are B′s, and that B′ is a subconcept of B. On the basis of these denitions, it
follows that every C′ must in its turn be also a C; in other terms, C′ must be
a subconcept of C. Classifying a concept amounts to identifying such implicit
superconcept-subconcept relations in taxonomy. But for human subjects such
a process is far from a natural, fast and automatic one.
So, the inferential task of classifying concepts in taxonomies is prima facie
qualitatively dierent from the task of categorising items as instances of a
certain class on the basis of typical traits (e.g., the task of categorising Fido
as a dog because he barks, has fur and wags his tail).
Note that in this perspective, the approach to prototypical representation
of concepts based on non-monotonic extensions of some DL formalism (see
section 3 above) seems to be particularly implausible. The idea at the basis of
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such an approach is that the prototypical representation of concepts should be
obtained by increasing DLs with non-monotonic constructs that should allow
defeasible information to be represented. In such a way, the categorisation
based on prototypical traits is a process homogeneous to classication, but still
more demanding, and needs to be carried out with an even more more complex
formalism (it is well-known that, in general, non-monotonic formalisms have
worse computational properties than their monotonic counterparts).7
In this spirit, we argue that conceptual representation in computational
systems could demand (at least) two dierent kind of components responsi-
ble for dierent processes: type 2 processes, involved in complex inference
tasks and which does not take into account the representation of prototypical
knowledge, and fast automatic type 1 processes, which perform such tasks as
categorisation taking advantage of prototypical information associated with
concepts. Moreover, it is likely that, in the human mind prototypical informa-
tion about concepts is coded in dierent ways [Murphy 2002; Machery 2005].
Recently, an implementation of the dual process-conceptual proposal pre-
sented was achieved [Ghignone, Lieto et al. 2013] and preliminarily tests were
carried out in a knowledge-based system involved in a question-answering task.
In such a system, imprecise and common sense natural language descriptions
of a given concept were provided as queries. The task designed for the eval-
uation consisted of individualising the appropriate concept that ts a given
description, by exploiting the inferential capability of the proposed hybrid
conceptual architecture. According to the assumption presented in [Frixione
& Lieto 2013], the system 1 component is based on the Conceptual Spaces
framework [Gärdenfors 2000] and the classical system 2 component on stan-
dard Description Logics and ontology based formalisms. An example of such
common-sense descriptions is: the big carnivore with black and yellow stripes
denoting the concept of tiger. The preliminary results obtained are encour-
aging and show that the identication and retrieval of concepts described by
typical features is considerably improved using such hybrid architecture, with
respect to the classical case, based simply on the use of ontological knowledge.
Furthermore, this result is obtained with a relatively limited computational
eort compared to the other, logic-based, approaches. These results suggest
that a dual process approach to conceptual representation of concepts can be
benecial to enhance the performance of articial systems in tasks involving
non-classical conceptual reasoning.
7. This does not amount to claim that, in general, non-monotonic extensions of
DLs are useless. Our claim is simply that they seem to be unsuitable (and cognitively
implausible) for the task of representing concepts in prototypical terms.
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